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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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Sovereign wealth funds are the latest topic de jour in interna-
tional  finance.  Over  the  past  half  dozen  years,  governments 
around  the  world,  primarily  in  emerging-market  economies, 
have accumulated rapidly a vast amount of international assets 
in the form of reserves and other holdings. The scope and scale 
of these activities raise profound questions about the structure 
and stability of the international financial system in the first 
decade of the 21st century.
This  policy  brief  provides  an  overview  of  this  trend  in 
governmental asset holdings and outlines some of the basic issues 
it raises for the international financial system. The size of official 
holdings of cross-border assets is often unknown to the citizens 
of the countries involved as well as to market participants.1 Strat-
egies for managing those assets in many cases are at best vague, 
offering  little  guidance  to  the  managers.  In  other  cases,  the 
strategies may be known to the managers but not to the general 
public. Actual or rumored changes in asset allocations have the 
potential  to  disrupt  international  financial  markets.  The  fact 
that governments own these assets raises the potential that their 
management will be guided by political, rather than economic 
and financial, considerations or that the economic and financial 
considerations are motivated by support for national champions 
(if a country accumulates excess oil reserves and invests them in 
foreign energy projects, this looks like exploitation of economic 
power not diversification). Consequently, host-country jurisdic-
tions are under increasing pressure to limit the scope of such 
investments, raising the specter of political confrontation and 
financial protectionism.2
Against this background, I present a framework for thinking 
about these issues. I make the case for a quantum increase in trans-
parency and accountability with respect to the management of 
sovereign wealth funds and other official holdings of cross-border 
assets. I then outline a proposal for an international standard to 
manage this activity while minimizing collateral damage.
Sovereign Wealth FundS: the iSSueS
In  the  broadest  terms,  increased  international  investment 
activities of governments in managing their foreign exchange 
reserves and other forms of international assets reflect trends in 
globalization and diversification. Over the past two decades at 
least, total global cross-border investments have expanded at a 
more rapid rate than international trade in goods and services, 
1. In some cases even the size of international reserve holdings is not known or 
the published numbers are suspect.
2. The Financial Times on July 13 reported that the German government is 
considering new legislation to block state-controlled foreign investments. It 
also reported that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has referred explicitly to 
the growing holdings of sovereign wealth funds as a source of this concern. The 
Financial Times on July 20 reported “the European Commission has launched an 
inquiry into whether vast state-controlled investment funds from Russia, China 
and the Middle East threaten the continent’s single market.” Views within Europe 
are not uniform. The Financial Times carried two editorials on the topic during 
the week of July 23. During the same week, the Wall Street Journal had a lead 
story, and the Washington Post published an opinion piece by Steven Pearlstein on 
the subject.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 6     A uG u s t  2 0 0 7
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which in turn has expanded at almost twice the rate of global 
GDP. From 2001 to 2006, global GDP at current prices and 
exchange rates increased 53 percent, and global trade in goods 
and services increased 93 percent.3 Over a slightly earlier five-
year period that, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, was 
less conducive to rapid expansion of cross-border investments 
(1999–2004), the increase in international investment (foreign 
assets plus liabilities) was about 175 percent.4 
These broad trends reflect the increased integration of the 
global economy as well as a process of portfolio diversification 
that has had the effect of loosening the “home bias” in indi-
vidual, institutional, and governmental investment portfolios. 
The reduction of home bias has facilitated the financing of 
global imbalances with consequences that are as yet unknown 
at the same time that it has contributed to more balanced 
global asset portfolios.
At least until recently, emerging-market and other devel-
oping countries have not shared in these trends. Over the past 
two decades, the expansion of cross-border investments (assets 
plus  liabilities)  of  nonindustrial  countries  has  only  slightly 
exceeded their combined GDP growth rate. It was at about the 
same rate as their (rapid) growth in trade in goods and services 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006). This pattern has changed. 
Total official foreign exchange reserves are more than $5 
trillion. The net increase has been 140 percent over the past 
five years. Recorded holdings of nonindustrial countries have 
reached $3.5 trillion, a net increase of 180 percent over the 
period.  This  total  understates  the  increase  in  official  hold-
ings of foreign assets because a portion of the accumulation 
has  been  redirected  into  stabilization  funds,  nonrenewable 
resource funds, sovereign wealth funds, or similar vehicles. 
Official holdings of international assets in addition to offi-
cial reserves can be estimated between $1.5 trillion and $2.5 
trillion.5  However,  accurate  figures  are  unavailable  because 
3. International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook database, 
April 2007.
4. This estimate is based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). As a partial 
check, for the United States the growth in nominal GDP from 1999 to 2004 
was 18 percent, US trade in goods and services expanded 33 percent, and the 
increase in US international investment (foreign assets plus liabilities) was 42 
percent.
5. Jen (2007) has estimated the high-end figure for the end of 2007.
many countries do not publish comprehensive information on 
their holdings of foreign assets.6 In some cases, there is double 
counting  with  official  foreign  exchange  reserves,  holdings 
include assets in domestic currency, or holdings are parked 
in foreign investments pending their use for domestic devel-
opment purposes. Table 1 provides information on 20 funds 
of 18 countries with estimated holdings in sovereign wealth 
funds, or their equivalent, of at least $10 billion. The total is 
about $2 trillion.7 
Ten of the 18 countries listed in table 1 hold gross foreign 
exchange reserves of at least $30 billion.8 However, as shown 
in table 2, many of the 30 holders of foreign exchange reserves 
in  excess  of  that  figure  have  not  yet  established  sovereign 
wealth funds or their equivalent, and many of those that have 
done so could shift much larger amounts into such entities, 
for  example,  China,  Russia,  Korea,  Singapore,  and  Malay-
sia among the top ten holders of foreign exchange reserves. 
Moreover, countries are broadening the type of assets in which 
they are investing their foreign exchange reserves, and noth-
ing prevents them from managing their reserves as sovereign 
wealth funds are managed.9 Finally, some governments distin-
guish  between  their  reserve  assets  and  other  international 
holdings of the government or the monetary authorities. For 
example,  the  Saudi  Arabian  Monetary  Authority  (SAMA) 
reported that its foreign exchange assets were $23.2 billion as 
of April 2007. For the same date, SAMA reported additional 
holdings on its balance sheet of $184 billion in investment 
in foreign securities and $31 billion in deposits with foreign 
banks  and  reported  as  memorandum  items  investment  in 
foreign securities by independent organizations of $51 billion. 
Thus, Saudi Arabia can be said to have at least $235 billion 
in international investments by the government outside of its 
foreign exchange holdings without having formally set up a 
sovereign wealth fund or its equivalent.10
6. Countries generally publish information on their reserve holdings, but often 
even that information is incomplete.
7. In addition to the 20 funds of 18 countries listed in table 1, 12 active funds 
of 12 countries can be identified with about $30 billion in combined holdings.
8. Foreign exchange holdings of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Kazakh-
stan, and Venezuela exceed $20 billion, but they are not large enough to be 
listed among the top 30 holders in table 2.
9. The IMF’s fifth Balance of Payments Manual defines reserves as “external 
assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities 
for direct financing of payments imbalances, for indirectly regulating the 
magnitudes of such imbalances through intervention in exchange markets 
to affect the currency exchange rate, and/or for other purposes.” While some 
might interpret this definition as excluding certain types of assets from foreign 
exchange reserves, countries follow a range of different practices. The reserves 
template of the IMF’s special data dissemination standard is intended to 
provide increased disclosure about the nature of the assets countries report as 
their foreign exchange reserves.
10. Table 1 also does not list Dubai Holding. Dubai is one of the United Arab 
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Table 1    Large sovereign wealth funds
       
Current sizea
(billions of 
US dollars) Country Name
Date 
established
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976 500 to 875e
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 1981          100 to 0er
Norway Government Pension Fund–Global 1990 08
Kuwait Future Generations Fund 1976 174
Russia Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation 004 1
Singapore Temasek Holdingsb 1974 108
China Central Huijin Investment Companyb 00 66e
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority 005 50e
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 000 4
Australia Future Fundb 006 4
United States Alaska Permanent Fundb 1976 40
Kuwait General Reserve Fund 1960 9
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 198 0e
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 005 0r
Malaysia Khazanah Nasionalb 199 18
Kazakhstan National Oil Fund 000 18
Venezuela  National Development Fundc 005 15
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fundb 1976 14
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 000 1e
New Zealand Superannuation Fundb 001 10
Totald ,0
       
e = estimate,  r = some or all assets are included in reserves 
a. Data are from the end of 006 or the most recent date available. 
b. A portion of the holdings is in domestic assets. 
c. A portion of these holdings is intended for domestic investment. 
d. Total uses the midpoint of the range of estimates.
By  contrast  with  industrial  countries,  governments  of 
nonindustrial  countries  are  more  actively  involved  in  their 
countries’  international  investments.  The  governments  of 
India,  China,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  Korea,  and  Malaysia 
controlled, on the basis of conservative estimates, at least 60 
percent of their countries’ cross-border investments as of the 
end of 2005. The comparable figure for the United States was 
2.5 percent, and even for Norway, with its huge sovereign 
wealth fund, the figure was only 45 percent.11 Large cross-
Emirates. Little information is published about the size and investments of 
Dubai Holding. Most regard it as a private investment vehicle of the ruling 
family of Dubai. China’s  Central Huijin Investment Company, which has been 
used to recaptialize state-owned banks in China, is listed, but it should not be 
confused with China’s proposed state foreign exchange investment company.
11. For most of these countries these estimates for 2005 are based on data in 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. They include reserve assets (including 
border holdings in official hands are at sharp variance with 
today’s general conception of a market-based global economy 
assets other than foreign exchange) plus other investments by monetary au-
thorities or the general government, where these subcategories of other invest-
ments are reported separately. However, according to the IMF’s fifth Balance of 
Payments Manual, countries’ official holdings of foreign equity and debt securi-
ties other than as reserves assets should be reported along with private holdings 
of each category of assets. This presumably is the case, but the public-private 
split is not provided. For Norway, the figure in the text is reserves plus the re-
ported holdings of Norway’s Government Pension Fund–Global as of the end 
of 2005. By way of historical comparison, in 1976 the US government’s share 
of US international assets was only 19.5 percent; it declined to 15.8 percent 
in 1986, 6.1 percent in 1996, and 2.3 percent in 2006. The source of the esti-
mates for the United States is Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department 
of Commerce, US Net International Investment Position at Yearend 2006, June 
2007. The US figures combine US official reserve assets and other US federal 
government assets; they do not include government holdings of international 
assets at the subfederal level, for example, by state pension funds.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 6     A uG u s t  2 0 0 7
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Table 2    Foreign exchange reserves
     
Current sizea

































s = some or all holdings are included in sovereign
      wealth funds. 
a. Data are from the end of March 007 or the most 
    recent date available. 
b. Has one or more sovereign wealth fund listed in 
    table 1. 
 
   Source: International Monetary Fund, International 
   Financial Statistics, 007.
and financial system in which decision making is largely in 
the hands of numerous private agents pursuing commercial 
objectives.
Governments  manage  their  international  investments 
using a continuum of institutional mechanisms. At one end 
are traditional international reserves managed by central banks 
and/or finance ministries, where considerations of liquidity 
and low risk normally are paramount. 
Further along the continuum are stabilization funds accu-
mulated from “excess” revenues from commodity exports in 
particular. Stabilization funds may invest in a slightly wider 
range of assets, but considerations of liquidity and low risk still 
predominate because, by design, stabilization funds may be 
drawn upon when commodity prices decline. They are designed 
primarily to achieve medium-term macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion  objectives,  including  the  sterilization  of  the  domestic 
economic and financial effects of surges in export earnings.
Toward  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  are  sovereign 
wealth funds, which generally have longer-term investment 
objectives and, therefore, may hold an even broader array of 
assets. In addition, many governments own, manage, or spon-
sor domestic entities such as banks or corporations or groups 
of such entities through holding companies that have invest-
ments in other countries, including direct, controlling owner-
ship interests. 
In  practice,  each  of  these  mechanisms  may  involve 
elements of reserve management, stabilization, and the trans-
fer of wealth across generations. This mixture of motivations 
reinforces  the  case  for  considering  sovereign  wealth  funds 
in a broader context of the external investment activities of 
governments. The official sector accumulates foreign assets as 
a result of purchases on the foreign exchange market, govern-
ment external borrowing, the operation of entities that direct-
ly  or  indirectly  generate  foreign  exchange  earnings  for  the 
government, or more rarely as part of the implementation of 
a sophisticated policy of intergenerational wealth transfer that 
may involve all three types of activities. Even if the foreign 
assets are not ultimately recorded as foreign exchange reserves, 
they often pass through those accounts.
Governmental  foreign  investment  activities  have  many 
similarities in their objectives, management, and motivations 
with  activities  of  private-sector  entities.  In  particular,  the 
objectives and activities of some sovereign wealth funds do not 
differ significantly from those of pension funds found in the 
private or public sector or investments by firms that manage 
private portfolios of assets that serve comparable purposes.
It is clear that official holdings of foreign assets are grow-
ing rapidly as a result of governmental policies as well as the 
magic of compound interest even at low yields. Consequently, 
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of national and international economic and financial policy 
because of their size, their lack of transparency, their potential 
to disrupt financial markets, and the risk that political objec-
tives might influence their management.
Once a government has accumulated foreign exchange 
resources  beyond  what  it  believes  is  necessary  to  cover  its 
presumptive  short-term  needs,  which  may  well  not  be  a 
precise figure, it has to decide how to manage its holdings. 
These international investment activities of governments, in 
turn, derive from and are influenced by a number of distinct 
policy perspectives. They interact with a government’s foreign 
and domestic debt-management policies with respect to the 
stocks of assets and liabilities and the resulting net positions. 
They also interact with policies directed in the short run at 
managing fiscal positions, growth, inflation, capital flows, and 
exchange  rates.  In  particular,  governments  may  attempt  to 
sterilize the monetary impact of the accumulation of external 
assets by issuing domestic debt. Sterilization brings into play 
the issue of net return on cross-border investments, which 
may be negative. In addition, even if sterilization is techni-
cally 100 percent, the overall effects of the accumulation of 
foreign assets on the macroeconomy may not be negligible 
because, for example, short-term assets can be liquidated to 
finance current consumption, and longer-term assets can be 
collateralized to finance investment and consumption.
Among the policy issues that arise are the capacity of the 
economy to absorb foreign resources efficiently, the growth 
rate of the economy, its inflation rate, and matters involving 
investment  policies  and  intergenerational  equity.  To  what 
extent should the current population benefit, to what extent 
should future generations benefit, and how should the two be 
linked through the funding of pension systems?12
Issues of growth and development arise with respect to 
the management of international assets in traditional indus-
trial countries like Norway, Canada, and Australia, as well as 
in economies that more recently have reached high levels of 
income per capita such as Singapore. However, such issues are 
more salient in developing and emerging-market economies 
where the demand for, and the presumptive social return on, 
investment at home exceeds the likely return on investment 
abroad regardless of the nature of that investment.13
12. In this discussion, I set to one side important issues of intertemporal bud-
get policy and what institutional mechanisms are preferable in addressing these 
issues. My primary focus is on the government’s management of its holdings 
of external assets (and implicitly of its external liabilities) regardless of how or 
why they were accumulated.
13. This statement should be qualified to recognize that there is a case for 
international diversification of asset holdings independent of the relative rates 
of return on those assets.
The challenge is that once a country has accumulated a 
substantial portfolio of foreign assets (based on some metric 
such as a percentage of GDP, months of imports of goods 
and services, or years of external debt service) it is not easy 
to put the stock of those assets to work at home for devel-
opmental purposes. To do so, a country not only has to stop 
accumulating foreign assets but also has to convert some or 
all  of  the  accumulated  stock  back  into  domestic  currency 
in effect reversing the economic policies that initially led to 
their accumulation, which may or may not be appropriate to 
the country’s circumstances. Borrowing domestically against 
foreign assets or using them to support the capital positions 
of domestic entities is also problematic for some of the same 
reasons. In addition, such a policy raises issues of risk sharing 
within the government accounts and with the private sector 
associated with currency mismatches. 
Similarly,  a  case  has  been  made  that  foreign  exchange 
reserves or other accumulations of sovereign wealth should not 
be invested in industrial countries that, in principle, should 
have  ample  savings  to  finance  domestic  investment.  Some 
argue that the financial resources instead should be invested 
in domestic or foreign assets within the region. 14 However, 
if all countries in the region are in current account surplus, 
accumulating  net  investments  abroad,  recycling  surpluses 
from country A to country B and from country B to country 
A does not produce any new investment in either country A 
or country B. Ultimately, the destination of the net flow must 
be external to the region though in the process returns may be 
enhanced or redistributed.
In the case of stabilization funds, which are designed in 
part to facilitate countercyclical fiscal policies, the challenges 
14. This argument is part of the rationale for the development of so-called 
Asian Bond Funds. The rest of the rationale is to promote the development 
of domestic capital market infrastructure, which might in time contribute to 
increased domestic investment.
Management of official holdings of 
foreign assets has become a major 
focus of national and international 
economic and financial policy 
because of their size, their lack of 
transparency, their potential to 
disrupt financial markets, and the 
risk that political objectives might 
influence their management.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 6     Au Gu s t  2 0 0 7
6
and those interests are varied. Citizens differ in their rates 
of time preference. They may favor more or less govern-
ment involvement in private financial markets. They may 
have different views on what types of investments will 
generate the best returns or on the prudential and ethical 
standards the government should employ in its interna-
tional investment activities.
•	 The government itself has its own distinct policy interests. 
They may be financial. They may relate to the government’s 
interpretation of its objectives and responsibilities. They 
may be purely economic or may be affected by political 
considerations, international or domestic.
•	 Financial-market participants abroad as well as at home 
are  not  indifferent  to  how  governments  manage  their 
international  investments,  in  particular  when  those 
investments may be large, and changes in their allocation 
may  affect  the  behavior  of  international  and  domestic 
financial markets. Those interests may not be uniform or 
perfectly aligned with those of the investing government 
or its citizens. For some market participants, the major 
consideration may be market efficiency. Others may seek 
to  benefit  by  assisting  governments  in  managing  their 
international assets. A third group may seek to exploit 
inside information. For both of the last two subgroups, 
issues arise of actual or potential conflicts of interest.
•	 Finally, foreign investments by governments, by defini-
tion, affect not only market participants generally but also 
the interests of the authorities and citizens in the jurisdic-
tions in which the investments are made. For example, 
investment activities must conform to the host country’s 
laws and regulations. The authorities of those countries 
are concerned about the integrity, stability, and efficiency 
of  their  financial  markets.  Moreover,  investments  by 
foreign governments may influence the structure, level, 
and volatility of prices, yields, and exchange rates. In some 
cases, the host-country government and its citizens may 
be skeptical of a broad role for government in managing 
a foreign country’s international investments, at best, and 
concerned about its underlying motives, at worst. 
Thus,  important  issues  of  international  economic  and 
financial policy cooperation come into play with respect to the 
management of sovereign wealth funds, including importantly 
maintaining the openness of economies and financial systems 
to cross-border investments.
the CaSe For inCreaSed tranSparenCy 
and aCCountability
Governments have, and will continue to manage, internation-
al investments. In some cases, governments have been thrust 
are somewhat different. The technical, financial, and political 
issues involve reaching agreement on what is the trend and 
what is the cycle. The same issues arise with respect to sover-
eign wealth funds, including those derived from the export 
of nonrenewable resources, in the form of how much of the 
return on and, potentially, the principal amount of those assets 
should be used to cover current government expenditures or 
compensate  for  revenue  shortfalls.  The  evaluation  of  these 
considerations changes over time for reasons sound and less 
sound in terms of economics and finance.
Nevertheless,  a  government  with  a  substantial  (and 
potentially growing) stock of foreign assets in excess of its 
likely immediate needs to use them has an implicit or explicit 
investment strategy. The case for an explicit strategy is stron-
ger the larger the holdings, in part to guide and protect those 
executing the strategy.
It  is  dangerous  to  oversimplify  the  choices  involved 
in  choosing  an  investment  strategy.  The  choice  is  not  just 
a  matter  of  trading  higher  long-term  expected  returns  for 
increased risk. For example, the return on US treasury bills 
is low, but that statement does not provide much guidance 
about what is the most appropriate alternative investment. A 
strategy of buying and holding foreign equities may generate 
higher expected returns over the medium term, but it may not 
be appropriate for a country that wants to generate a smooth 
stream of returns from its foreign investments, possibly to 
cover fiscal deficits.
Thus, the optimal strategy for a government with respect 
to the management of its external assets depends on its broader 
economic policy objectives. In part as a consequence, any invest-
ment strategy raises issues of accountability and transparency.
A government’s decisions with respect to the management 
of its international investments may affect at least four groups:
•	 The citizens of the country have an interest in how their 
government manages the collective assets of their country, 
...important issues of international 
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into this position as the result of the unintended consequences 
of other policies, for example, maintaining a pegged exchange 
rate  in  the  face  of  rising  current  account  surpluses  and/or 
inflows of foreign capital, as in the cases of China, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore. In other cases, governments find 
themselves there by design, for example, managing intergen-
erational transfers of wealth, as in the case of Norway. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  revised  US  legislation  governing 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
which focuses on the role of investments by governments, and 
the discussion of similar legislation in Germany and elsewhere 
in Europe illustrate, many governments and their citizens are 
uncomfortable and suspicious of the role of foreign govern-
ments  in  their  large-scale  international  investments.  The 
revision in US law was fueled by controversies surrounding 
the proposed takeover of Unocal by the state-owned China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 2005 and 
the proposed acquisition of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation  Company  by  Dubai  Ports  World,  a  company 
owned and controlled by the government of the United Arab 
Emirates  (see  Graham  and  Marchick  2006).  In  Germany, 
Chancellor  Angela  Merkel’s  parliamentary  leader  Volker 
Kauder stated, “This is about protecting important industrial 
sectors from the political influence of other states.” However, 
another government official said, “This is not about industrial 
policy” (Financial Times, July 13, 2007).
What should be done? The international investment activ-
ities of governments have achieved a sufficient scale and scope 
that a strong case can be made for a collective effort to establish 
an internationally agreed standard to guide the management by 
governments of their cross-border investments. The standard 
should apply to the gamut of international investment activi-
ties of governments, starting with traditional foreign exchange 
reserves and extending to stabilization funds, nonrenewable 
resource funds, sovereign wealth funds, government-owned or 
controlled entities such as pension funds, investment holding 
companies, and miscellaneous international assets.
The international standard on government cross-border 
investments  by  sovereign  wealth  funds  and  other  entities 
should cover at least the following four topics:
•			Objectives and Investment Strategy. The standard should 
establish the presumption that the international invest-
ment activities of governments are based on clearly stated 
policy objectives, including how the funds are incorporat-
ed into the investment mechanism (or entity), how earn-
ings and/or principal should be spent or redeployed, what 
types of assets are included in portfolios, how the assets 
should be managed, where the responsibilities for their 
management lie, what investment and risk-management 
strategies should be followed, and how these elements can 
be changed. At the same time, it makes no economic or 
political sense to think that an investment strategy should 
be etched in stone although principles of sound public 
policy suggest that it should not be modified frequently 
or capriciously.
•	 Governance. The standard should set out clearly the role 
of the government and the managers of the investment 
mechanism, what entity sets the policies, how those polic-
es are executed, and the accountability arrangements. To 
the extent that the international investment mechanism is 
making anything other than passive investments in finan-
cial assets (deposits, notes, bonds, and nonvoting shares), 
guidelines for corporate governance should be enunciated 
and followed. Responsibility for ensuring compliance with 
those guidelines should be clearly established. In some 
countries, there may also be a desire to have guidelines or 
a process to deal with ethical issues, for example, types of 
activities or circumstances in which investments should 
not be made, as has been done for Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund–Global.
•	 Transparency. The operations of the investment mecha-
nisms should be as transparent as possible. Transparency 
promotes horizontal accountability among the interested 
parties and stakeholders (domestic and international) as 
well as vertical accountability within the policy process. 
In practice, transparency should involve at least annual 
reports  and  preferably  quarterly  reports.  It  would  be 
desirable to have substantial quantitative disclosure about 
investment  strategies,  outcomes,  and  the  nature  and 
location of actual investments. It would also be desirable 
to  subject  the  activities  of  investment  mechanisms  to 
published, independent audits.
•	 Behavior. Depending on the type of mechanism, its size, 
and the scope of its activities, it would be desirable to 
establish behavioral guidelines with respect to its manage-
The international investment activities 
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These considerations strengthen the case for operating under a 
generally accepted standard for such activities.
The outlines of this proposal are not revolutionary. Most 
would regard them as common sense. Moreover, while it is 
not universal practice, an increasing number of official entities 
with significant stakes in national or global financial markets 
provide substantial amounts of information in various formats 
to other market participants. 
For example, under the reserves template of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s special data dissemination standard 
(SDDS),  at  least  26  holders  of  foreign  exchange  reserves 
disclose at least once a year the detailed currency composi-
tion of their reserves.16 A number of countries also disclose 
separately or in addition substantial information about asset 
composition of their reserve holdings and/or reserve manage-
ment strategies as part of their participation in the SDDS or 
national policy.17
In addition, a small but growing number of sovereign 
wealth funds (broadly defined to include stabilization funds, 
renewable  resource  funds,  and  government  investment 
holding companies) now provide their citizens, the market, 
and the general public, including outside the country, with 
information  on  the  objectives,  investment  strategies,  and 
16. The reserves template of the SDDS requires that participants disclose 
the currency composition of their reserves in terms of those held in the four 
SDR currencies (the US dollar, euro, yen, and pound sterling) as a group 
and all other currencies as a second group. Sixty of 65 countries comply with 
the requirement. The reserves template recommends, but does not require, a 
further breakdown of the currency composition of reserves, and 26 holders 
do so, including New Zealand, which is not a participant in the SDDS. As of 
April 2007, the holdings of these disclosers totaled $738 billion or almost 14 
percent of total foreign exchange reserves as of that date.
17.  See Truman and Wong (2006) for details as of mid-2006; since then three 
entities have joined the group of disclosers.
ment. For example, the behavioral guidelines might cover 
the scale and rapidity with which the entity adjusts its 
portfolio.  They  might  also  create  the  presumption  of 
consultation with the relevant countries with respect to 
the  allocation  among  assets  denominated  in  different 
currencies or located in different countries.15
The basic case for the proposed approach rests on two 
major considerations: accountability and protection.
•	 Accountability involves the citizens of the home country, 
the citizens of the host country (who may distrust the 
motives of the foreign government), and the international 
financial community in general, including other partici-
pants in global financial markets.
•	 Protection is relevant to the managers of the investment 
entity. The broader the investment strategy of the entity 
in terms of the risk-reward tradeoff, the more likely it is 
that losses will be made from time to time along with 
higher overall returns. The aim is to prevent misunder-
standings or worse. It is also relevant to other participants 
in financial markets who do not want to be side-swiped 
by the actions of governments. Finally, it is relevant to the 
government of the home country that wants to have maxi-
mum freedom to pursue profitable investment opportuni-
ties without the risk of intervention by the government or 
broader political forces in the host country, for example, 
in the form of financial protectionism.
Governments  are  understandably  concerned  about  not 
compromising  their  room  to  maneuver  in  managing  their 
international investments. They want to protect their sover-
eignty, confidentiality, and capacity to make “strategic” invest-
ments. However, once a government seeks to operate outside 
its national borders, then it no longer is “sovereign” in most 
respects. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, sovereign immunity 
does not apply to foreign governments’ commercial activities. 
A government that operates outside its own borders or via 
mechanisms that directly affect other markets and economies 
has a responsibility to seek cooperative solutions. Such solu-
tions may involve less confidentiality than the government 
would like, but similar de facto and de jure constraints exist 
within most jurisdictions for private-sector investors.
Governments also may be concerned that their activities 
not be micromanaged, in particular to the extent that the 
effect is to raise costs and lower net returns on investments. 
15. The IMF’s recently revised decision (IMF 2007a) on members’ policies 
under Article IV governing exchange rate arrangements includes, as did the 
1977 decision, the principle that “Members should take into account in their 
intervention policies the interests of other members, including those of the 
countries in whose currencies they intervene.”
A government that operates outside 
its own borders or via mechanisms 
that directly affect other markets and 
economies has a responsibility to seek 
cooperative solutions. Such solutions 
may involve less confidentiality than 
the government would like, but similar 
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results of their management of these entities. For example, 
Norway’s  Government  Pension  Fund–Global  provides  the 
general public with extensive information on its investment 
strategy and investment results on a quarterly basis, including 
month-by-month  returns,  and  annually  provides  informa-
tion on its holdings of the bonds and equities of individual 
countries  and  corporations. Temasek  Holdings,  Singapore’s 
holding company founded in 1974, recently began publishing 
an annual report containing considerable detail on its invest-
ments, but its sister institution the Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation founded in 1981 has yet to publish 
regularly information about the size and nature of its holdings. 
In July 2007, the Kuwait Investment Authority for the first 
time revealed its total holdings are $213 billion ($174 billion 
in Kuwait’s Future Generations Fund and $39 billion in its 
General Reserve Fund), which is about half the size of the 
estimate by the Institute of International Finance (2007).18
The question is how best to build upon these trends. In 
the  first  instance,  governments  have  to  reach  a  consensus. 
However, these are not purely sovereign decisions and can 
become a source of economic, financial, or political conflict. 
The global community, private as well as public, has an inter-
est in what governments decide.
Best practice in this area could continue to evolve in an 
ad hoc manner in response to domestic and international pres-
sures. Alternatively, a group of governments could together 
establish a standard for sovereign wealth funds and similar 
vehicles. They might ask the IMF or World Bank to assist 
them in this effort. Alternatively the Fund and/or the Bank 
could take an initiative.19
18. The estimate of the Institute of International Finance included all foreign 
assets; reported reserves were $20 billion as of April 2007.
19. US Treasury Acting Undersecretary Clay Lowery (2007) proposed that 
the Fund and Bank develop best practices for sovereign wealth funds.  He 
also stressed the importance of informal consultations on foreign asset ac-
cumulation, the need for national governments to ensure that mechanisms to 
review foreign direct investment preserve national security without creating 
unnecessary and counterproductive barriers, and the responsibilities of the US 
government in this regard.  In connection with the last point, Lowery reported 
that US Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt had “been traveling in 
Beijing and Moscow meeting with government officials and business leaders to 
promote open investment policies and to gain clarity on their new investment 
laws and to better understand the nature and investment priorities of their 
soon to be established sovereign wealth funds. The message delivered clearly to 
the Deputy Secretary from officials in both countries is that the funds would 
focus primarily on portfolio investments such as corporate bonds and equities.  
When asked about the possibility of foreign direct investment acquisitions, 
officials in both countries indicated that is not in their current planning but 
if such an opportunity arose in the future, it would be in non-sensitive sec-
tors.” Truman (2007) a few weeks earlier argued that the Fund has a positive, 
potential role with respect to developing best practice standards with regard to 
all cross-border investments by governments.  IMF (2007b) contains many of 
the basic components of a useful framework in the context of the management 
of revenues from resources and the IMF’s code of good practices on fiscal 
transparency.
The clear goal of any such effort would be to contrib-
ute not only to financial stability in the countries directly 
involved but also to international financial stability as a whole 
by increasing the transparency, accountability, and predict-
ability of the operations of governments in managing their 
international investments and discharging their obligations to 
current and future generations.
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